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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

HR1\.NHAM.

Pla111t1/] and Appellant,
vs.
:U\1

J

jr\CKSOl\: and VERA M.

J:\C:KSON,
Dcfwdanls and Respondents.

Case No.
9412

BJRLIN CLOVE COMPANY, et al.,

ln/crl'('nors and Respondents.

Brief of lntervenors and Respondents

<I,"'. TEME!\:T OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
; 11, Lkb stated in appellant's Brief are correct so far as

'·'ml· .1 rc stated. but there are these additional facts which
ii "i· 1 ·rJrnt~ bclieYe have a bearing on this controversy.

?1.1111w} and appellant sought and was granted compen·' "n f.,r the services rendered in selling the property involved

1

in this action. Defendants, Tom ]. Jackson
by their attorney stated that:

:.i

11 d

v,

~

d,I 11!

i.

·"" ·

. "'!"he. defendants wiU stipulate the rtLtip:, .
liquidation of the busmess will be assii..:nrd. ,, ·
(Jackson) for the_ benefit of his creditors ~\·ht, Jr't' .
tors of the Fr?ntler Shop, either in the a(gu:;ir ..:~··
the me~chan~ise, the properties of the bL:.'iilt·,
connection with the business."
·
Thereupon the Court stated:
"The record may show that stipulation" (Tr :
The Court then stated the stipulation of Counsel tor rht F~~:
as he understood the same. The substance of such statemen:.
the Court is as follows:
"That the plaintiff may remain in possess10n of::·
goods and merchandise of the Frontier Shop anci r·
ceed to liquidate the merchandise on hand and holci:t::
same in trust, subject to the payment of the necess.ir.
expenses of selling the same, that the surplus wo·~.:
be subject to the payment of the balance O\\tng to:~:
plaintiff and then pay the other creditors ratablr ··
At the time the stipulation was made Attorney (ox ~::
resented Salt Lake Hardware Company, Strevell-Patersor. C ·
pany and Acme Quality Paint Company. That defendants snt> ..
execute a written assignment to plaintiff of the merchandise.:.: fixtures owned by the Frontier Shop. So far as appca:· ·
written assignment was ever made. (Tr. 4-14).
Among the terms of the agreement between plamtitl in~'
court below, appellant in this court, and the defendants 1 ~

:::

court below, respondents in this court, are the following:
"D. In the event Jacksons fail, neglect or refuse ._
comply with each and all of the covenants here.:

2

rmJe for their ohservance that Branham may ded.trt· a breach of this agreement and go into pos,c~~1P!l ot said premises and property as in the
11 r't 1nstJnlc and all payments made and improve1~1t rm placed thereon shall become the property
ll'
Branham as liquidated damages for said
breach."

1 h rl1c e\ent of any controversy relative to the
uimplian((: with the terms hereof the party at
t.iulr aprees to pay any damages suffered by the
11111rn cnt party. including reasonable attorney fees,
;( .1nv attorney is employed on account of such
urntroversy.

· r In

the event of forfeiture as provided for herein
Jacksons agree to release to Branham, or his as~t{~ns. :di property, leases and agreements incorClirporared and referred to herein." (R. 15) .

.\r the mJI Branham attempted to identify the merchan-

'.·'t hl' ~,i1,J

to

Jenrif·.

rixtures. (Trs. -05-148).

the

the Jacksons, but was unable to do so. He did

ARGUMENT
,\i\S\XTR TO APPELLANTS POINT ONE. THE
; R,\t'\S:\CTION WHEREBY BRANHAM TOOK BACK
·1 Hr i\!FRCHANDISE AND FIXTURES WHICH HE
ll!RrFORE SOLD TO JACKSONS IS SUBJECT TO
'H !.,\ \\: OF THE BULK SALES ACT.
i' 1 · .L 1951.

Sec. 25-2-1, in part provides:

"It '>hall be the duty of every person who shall barfor or purchase any portion of a stock of goods,
\I ..ire~ or mtrchandise in bulk otherwise than in the
'..:.llll

3

ordinary course of trade and in the re
.
.
gu 1ar and
..
prosecution
o f t h e sel !er .s bus mess
. usu,
0 r an entue t·.
.
'
o f m.erc h an d 1se in bulk, or any portion of the iuL,
furniture, fixtures or equipment or suppl
fp 10 pert•.
ies
o
restaurant, barber shop or other business . d .a hate'·
.
h b .
use in car'.
mg on sue
usmess, othern 1se than in th
·':
e regu:1
course o f tra d e, be f ore paving to the selle
·
·
.
r anv par
f
h
o t e purchase pnce thereof. or deliver,nr- :.
.
.
o a~ ~~
m1ssory note or other en<lence of indebtedness the::
fore, to demand
and receive from such seller a rn~
,
.
. .
statement m wntmg as hereinafter provided of ili:
names and addresses of all the creditors of the sell i
together with the amounts of the indebtedness duee'.:
owmg by the seller to each of bis creditors and it shat'
be the duty of the seller to furnish such statementwhi:\
shall be verified by oath to substantially the followmi
effect."
·
1

There follows the form of the oath which provides that ti:e
creditors to be specified in the oath are:
"Creditors holding claims due or which will becomt
due for or on account of goods. \\ares or merchandiic
purchased upon credit or for the purchase price due c:
owing by (seller) to such creditors on account of mone
borrowed to carry on the business. whICh said good\
fixtures, equipment or supplies appertain.'
It will be seen from the provis10ns of the Contract betweefi
Branham and the Jacksons above mentioned that the Jackso:.<
were given possession of the property and the Jacksons rn We
of default were required to release to Branham, or his assigns
all property, leases and agreements incorporated and referrec

to herein.
It is provided in U.C.A. 195 3, 60-2-2, that title to specific
goods passes when the parties so intend.

4

UC.A. J Sl~:). 60-2-3, lays down the rules that shall be

w

a lied in determining when title to goods passes. It is there
d'
.
.
provided that unless a 1tterent mtent10n appears the title passes.
"Rule 1. Where there is an unconditional contract

to sell specified goods in a deliverable state the property

,n the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is
made and it 1s immaterial whether the time of payment
or the time of delivery or both is postponed."

The other ruies there provided for ascertaining the intention
of the parties as well as the provisions of the contract for the
sale of the property here involved all indicate that it was the
intention of the parties that title should pass to the Jacksons
at the time the contract was entered into by them and Branham.
Moreover, it will be seen from the provisions of the Bulk Sales
Act that the required affidavit must be given when there is a
bargain for a sale.
Thus Branham stood in the same position with respect to
the duty to complv with the Bulk Sales Act as other persons
who buy goods in bulk. There is nothing in that law which
relieves the parties from complying with its terms merely
because Branham had theretofore owned the property here
involved.
Moreover, 1t will be seen from the terms of the Contract
between Branham and Jackson under date of July 16, 1958,
that in case of breach Branham was entitled to go into possession of said premises and property as in the first instance and
all payments made and improvements placed thereon shall
become the property of Branham as liquidated damages for
such breach. Such language does not even purport to give Bran-

5

ham any right to the merchandise that was purchased
.

.

OOc~~

by the Jacksons while they were m possession and operated the
store. It will be seen that the trial court found that Br h

.

.

.

~~

was unable to identify the merchandise which he sold to the
Jacksons. Counsel for appellant have not and cannot successful!i
attack such Finding.
Counsel for appellant cite 24 Am. fur., page 352. Sec.

204

in support of the doctrine that the Bulk Sales Act should ;
0
given a strict construction because the same is rn derogation
of the common law. Under the provisions of U.C.A. 195)
68-3-2, it is provided that statutes in derogation of the common
law shall be given a liberal construction. That is the holdmt
of this Court in a number of cases, among them are:
In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 Pac. 757;
State v. Barboglio, 63 Utah 423, 226 Par. 904;
Castle v. Delta Land & U'/ at er Co., 58 Utah 13;

1

197 Pac. 584.

Counsel also cite the case of Inglewood State Bank

1.

Legt·

man, 275 Pac. 935, in support of his contention that the Bulk
Sales Act has no application to the facts in this case. In our
view that case does not aid appellant. So far as appears, plaintill
Bank in that case had not sold any merchandise or other propertY
to defendant, and hence was not one of the parties which tht
Act was intended to protect. There was not involved m that
case any claims of creditors of the defendant who had supplied
him with merchandise, nor so far as appears was any merchan·
dise there involved that could not be identified as having been
included in the sale which plaintiff had made and later sought
to cancel under the terms of the contract of sale.
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1

ANSWFR TO APPELANT'S POINT TWO. THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AND
DECREEING THAT BRANHAM DID NOT HA VE A
PREFERENCE OVER OTHER CREDITORS OF JACK-

SON.
tnder Point II of Appellant's Brief it is argued that
because the contract of sale between plaintiff and defendants
was recorded those who sold merchandise to defendants had
notice of the terms of such sale.
The law seems to be well and uniformly settled that to
make a recorded instrument constructive notice it must be made
so by statutory law. The common law does not so provide. It is
said u1 45 Am. Jur., page 480, Sec. 105, that "in order to be
effective notice to third persons it is obvious that the instrument
recorded must be within the contemplation of the recording law
)JOCe it is only through such laws that the record operates as
constructive notice." Numerous cases are there cited in footnotes which support the text. There is nothing in our statutory
law which lends support to the claim that those who sold
merchandise to the Jacksons are chargeable with notice that
anv merchan<l1se so sold might be lawfully claimed by Branham. Indeed, if such were the law, the Bulk Sales Act would
be emasculated and the purchaser of a mercantile business on
time would find it difficult, if not impossible, to buy other
merchandise on credit.

ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT THREE. THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
FOLLOW THE ALLEGED STIPULATION OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS AND INTERVENORS.

7

Under Point III of Appellant's Brief it is argued th

h
at t e
Court was bound to give effect to the stipulation of Respo d
n ent1
to the effect that appellant Branham may first deduct and .
retain
from the receipts received from the sale of the merchandise
here involved the amount owing to him and ther: divide the
remainder ratably among the other creditors of the Jackson,
The only creditors at the time the alleged stipulation \'.as madt
that were represented by Attorney Cox were: Salt Lake Haidware Company, Strevell-Paterson and Acme Quality Pa.mt Com
pany. (Tr. 4). Obviously Attorney Cox had no authon~·

ti

enter into a binding stipulation on behalf of parties that ht
might thereafter represent. Moreover, the law 1s well and uniformly settled that an attorney in the absence of express
authority is without authority to give away the rights of his
clients. The law in such particular is thus stated m 5 Am. fur .

300, Sec. 70:
"It is a general principle that an attorney cannot b1
virtue of his general authority as attorney bmd his die~<
by any act which amounts to a surrender or waiver rn
whole or in part of any substantial right of the clien.
or do any act which will either release his client's debtoc
or his surety or substantially jeopardize his interests
in any way."
To the same effect is the law announced in ' CJ.S. P 1

Among the numerous cases cited to the foregoing texts is fon,1

et al. v. Noble, et al., 39 Pac. (2d) 486. 3 Cal. App. (2d) 116
Under the facts disclosed by the evidence, the Findings 01
Fact and Judgment in this case, the alleged Stipulation is wit~
out legal effect because appellant gave no consideration for the
stipulation. It is suggested by appellant that he undertook to

8

and did oversee the sale of the merchandise. That is true, but

he asked to be paid for such service and the Court granted him
,, preferred claim for all that he claimed leaving no consideration to support the benefits he seeks on account of the alleged
Stipulation.
ANSWER TO

POINT

FOUR OF APPELLANT'S

BRIEF.
The intervenors and respondents join with appellant in the
claim that the Court below erred in Finding and Decreeing
that Thorley Faussett and the Bank of St. George are entitled
to share with the other creditors of Jackson in the fund here
involved.
As to the claim of the Bank, we direct the attention of the
Court to the provision of the Bulk Sales Act, U.C.A. 1953,
25-2-1, which provides for those who are to be mentioned in
the affidavit as being those from whom money has been borrowed to carry on the business. There is no evidence that the
Bank of St. George loaned any money to the Jacksons to carry
on the business in which they were engaged.

CROSS APPEAL
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 74(b), the respondents
represented by Counsel who represent respondent, Berlin Glove
Company, et al., cross appeal from that part of the Judgment
wherein and whereby the sum of $350.00 is allowed as attorney
fees paid out of the fund derived from the sale of the merchandise here involved, and also from that part of the Judgment

9

awarding to appellant the sum of $911.00 as a I)>cfc r d .
r. e cla1rn
for the fixtures sold out of such fund.
ARGUMENT
POINT A
Appellant basis his claim for attorney fees with whKh tri
pay his attorney on the provisions of his Contrac:t with

tht

defendant Jacksons, which provides that if a party to the con
tract is in default in complying with the Contract. he shail bt
liable for damages, including a reasonable attorney fee, 1f ?n

attorney is employed on account of such controversy. (R. 111 .
So far as appears no legal services ''ere necessary or were ptr
formed in the process of selling the property The legal se:-virn
having been performed solely for the benefit of appellant. there
is no basis for, in effect, requiring defendant to pay for am part
of such service. There is no provision in the Bulk Sales ,-\::
which permits one creditor to recover an attorney fee to be paid
out of the fund derived from the sale of the property, and cer
tainly there is nothing in the Act which gives an attornev a
preferred claim, a part of which is to be paid by a creditor wh11
has not agreed to pay an attorney fee.
The Act provides that one who bargains for or purchase)
merchandise in bulk must cause the purchase money to bear
plied ratably, except as provided by law, to the parment ot
claims for merchandise, furniture and fixtures on credit. and
for money borrowed to carry on the business. If the numerous
creditors of a failing business should hold a note or other agree
ment for the payment of an attorney fee in the event an account
is placed with an attorney for collection, it may be that lll

10

01

the

JSodS

would be consumed in the payment of attorney's fees

and nothing would be left to pay creditors. The basis for
liabiiiry to pay an attorney fee is either because of a contract
or by provis10ns of law. The respondents here have not agreed
to contzibure to the payment of an attorney fee to Counsel for
olamtiff, and the Bulk Sales Act contains no such provision.
Branham 1s a mere creditor of the Jacksons the same as the other
creditors. Branham, the same as the intervenors, at one time
01\ned property which they sold on credit to the Jacksons. That
the Court erred in granting an attorney fee payable out of the

fees here involved see Fidelity and Co. v. Monroe, 133 Md.
270, 105 A 174.

POINT B
THE

TRIAL

COURT

ERRED

IN

GRANTING

APPELLANT A PREFERRED CLAIM IN THE SUM

OF $911.00 ON ACCOUNT OF THE FURNITURE OR
FIXTURES WHICH HE HAD THERETOFORE OWNED
AND SOLD TO DEFENDANTS JACKSONS.
At the trial of this cause plaintiff proceeded upon the
theory that he had a right to all of the property that he had
theretofore owned and conveyed to the Jacksons and sufficient
of the property that the Jacksons had purchased on credit to
pay him in full including what he owed his attorney. Apparently the trial court adopted such view, but denied Branham
a claim to the merchandise because he was unable to identify
that portion thereof which he had theretofore owned. It is the
contention of these respondents that the Court erred in awarding to Branham a preferred claim of $911.00, the value of the
fixtures.
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There is no language in the Bulk Saks Act whi l
.
cl gran(I
to a creditor of a seller of an entire stock of goods any f ·
.

~~

~laim. to that part of a stock of goods that he may be able to
identify as bemg the goods which he solJ. Indeed , if sueh a
construction were placed on the Act, it \\Ould lead to di
en t11
taking of evidence and in the end of ten lead to a mere
.
guess
as to who formerly owned the various pieces of property The
express provision of the Act is that the fund derived from rhe
sale of the property subject to the Bulk Sales Act shali Dt
divided ratably, except as to those claims preferred by laii.
There is nothing in the Act which provides that fixtures used
in the operation of a mercantile store are to be excluded from
the Act or that the proceeds from the sale ot fixtures used 1r
operation of a mercantile store are to be treareJ as a preferred
claim.
The attention of the Court is again called to those pro11·
sions of the Act which provide that every person who shall
bargain for or purchase any portion of a stock of goods, wares
or merchandise in bulk or any portion of the property. fixturei
equipment or supplies of a hotel, restaurant. barber shop

1J1

other business used in carrying on such business.
We are mindful of the rule that when special langua~t
is used to describe property followed by general languagt. ;ucr,
general language is limited in its application to property similar
to that described. The form of the affidavit shows that sul~
rule has no application here, in that, the affidavit makes no dis
tinction between money owing for merchandise. fixtures, equ:p
ment, service performed and money borrowed to cam on the
business. The furniture and fixtures were as much a part of the

12

1

business as was the merchandise. It was sold by Branham to
the Jacksons on credit and taken back by Branham and sold
the same as was the merchandise. That being so, Branham is
not entitled to a preferred claim for the value of the fixtures.
Such is the holding in the case of N. Sakelos and Co. v. Hutchin-

son Bros. 129 Md. 3?~~' 99 A 357, Berger v. Berger, 271 Wis.
292; 73 NW. 2nd 't;4:;'Parkham v. Thompson Co., 127 Ga. 306

56 SE 460.

The Judgment should be affirmed with the modification
herein urged.
LeROY COX
60 N. Main Street
St. George, Utah

ELIAS HANSEN

Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for lntervenors
and Respondents

1.l

